We find a high prevalence of Europeans giving equal financial transfers to their adult children, regardless of siblings' income differences. This behaviour is sharply different from previously documented for American counterparts and it is not predicted by any conventional model on family transfers. We build a model to explain the motives for European parental transfers which includes concern with fairness and leaves altruism as an additional motive. We show that, in contrast to the prediction of the pure altruism model, parents do not offset income inequality among their children but decide to give equal transfers in order to be "fair". However, the parents might start to give larger transfers to poorer children if the siblings' income inequality becomes unbearable from the parent's view. We find evidence for this behaviour using simulations for parameter's distributions and also microeconomic data of 9 European countries from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
Introduction
In a broad sense, there are two competing approaches to explain monetary and time transfers within the family: altruism and exchange. If the family members are linked by altruism, then their actions are driven by the concern of the well-being of each other. This approach was originated by Becker (1974) and Barro (1974) who stressed one of the most important (and strongest) implications of the altruistic regime: the neutrality result. It means that a non-distortionary intergenerational redistribution policy is neutralized when the family is linked by altruism. For instance, an increase in the income of the younger generation as result of a decrease in income taxes and financed by a reduction on the pensions of the elderly can be neutralized by the parents who, in turn, lower the transfers to their children. Contrary, in the exchange approach (Bernheim et al, 1985 and Cox, 1987) there is no crowding out of the redistribution policies. In this regime the parents give financial transfers to their children as a sort of payment for the time (or services) received from them in the form of help, visits, etc. Thus, an increase in the child income raises the price for the child service and might raise the corresponding payment, which does not neutralize the redistribution policy. Therefore, finding of motive for transfers is an important issue as it allows us to evaluate to which extent the redistribution policies can be crowded out or reinforced. In general, under altruism, the child income and the transfer amount are negatively related; while in the exchange setting, this relation should be positive.
Regularly it is found that the neutrality result does not hold and hence some authors have discarded the altruism as the motive to give transfers 1 . However, this is not sufficient to rule out altruistic motivations in favour of exchange. There are facts such as imperfect information of parents about income and labour opportunities of their descendants under which the neutrality prediction does not necessarily hold (McGarry, 1999; Villanueva, 2002 and Feinerman and Seiler, 2002) . In this matter, Laferrere and Wolff (2006) and Arrondel and Masson (2006) offer a comprehensive review of the literature on family transfers. Cox & Fafchamps (2008) also present a review on transfers but with a focus beyond the income effects on transfers.
Many studies show that transfers are given disproportionately to children while bequests are mainly equally shared. Always with US data, in Dunn and Phillips (1997) , Wilhem (1996) , McGarry (1999) and Norton & Van Houtven (2006) , more than 80% of the families intended to give equal inheritances. By contrast, only 17.7%
of the mothers from Light and McGarry (2004) give equal transfers to their adult children. Using the Health and Retirement Study dataset (HRS), McGarry (1999) finds that 6.4% of the households give equal transfers to their adult and non coresident children, and this percentage is 7% in McGarry & Schoeni (1995) . With the same dataset for years 1992-2002, we can infer from the results of Hochguertel and Ohlsson (2008) that between 4.8% and 12.5% of households give equal transfers to their children, although these figures include children of any age and residing or not in the same home with the parents. Since the majority of parents make equal division of states among their children, considerable research has been devoted to understand this fact, overlooking the explanation for equal transfers. However, information from the "Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe" (SHARE) shows striking results which could not be explained by the standard approaches from the literature on transfers. The prevalence of equal transfers between siblings is remarkably higher in Europe than in US (see table 1 ).
The existence of equal transfers might be caused by a social norm that stipulates to treat children equally. In behavioural economic experiments, fairness is a norm that commonly emerges (see Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 2002) from the interaction among individuals. Interestingly, the greater preference of the Europeans for more equality with respect to the Americans might help to understand the found results (see Alesina et al, 2004) . Beyond the traditional income effects explored in the family transfer literature, we argue that parents may treat their children equally regardless of the differences of income among siblings. Thus, the parents do not offset income inequality among their children by giving larger transfers to poorer children, but decide to give equal transfers in order to be fair. However, the parents may start to give larger transfers to the poorer children (such as is predicted by the altruistic regime) if the income inequality among siblings becomes unbearable from the parent's view.
We contribute to the study of family transfers by incorporating new elements such as the parental concern with fairness derived from a social norm and the degree of income inequality among siblings. We do not intend to rule out or accept altruism as the motive to give transfers, but use it as an additional motive for transfers. Indeed, our theoretical model does not predict full intergenerational nor intra-generational neutrality results such as the standard model of altruistic transfers. As we will see in the next section, the societies with a stronger concern with fairness and lower income inequality among siblings show a larger prevalence of equal transfers. In these types of societies the redistribution policies can still be effective. To support our findings, we use microeconomic data from SHARE for 9 European countries about the relationship between the prevalence of equal transfers and income differences among siblings. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model for parental transfers, the implications for the neutrality results and simulate the model; section 3 describes the data and the regression analysis and discusses the results; and finally, in section 4 we conclude.
Theoretical framework
We focus our attention on monetary transfers which go from parents to non co-resident adult children, while the transfers of time services go from children to parents. In the next sections we develop a model for parental transfers considering heterogeneity on altruism, concern with fairness and siblings' income inequality.
The model
Each family is composed of one parent and two children 2 . The parent is altruistic towards her children, so that the child utility levels enter in her own utility function. Thus, the parent wants to equalize marginal consumption between her and her children by adjusting transfers adequately. Since children generally show different income levels, it is expected that each child receives a different amount of transfer.
However, the parent faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to equalize marginal consumption by giving unequal transfers, but on the other hand she also wants to be fair by giving equal transfer amounts regardless of siblings' income differences 3 . Nevertheless, such desire has a limit because giving equal transfers precludes the parent to improve income distribution among her children by equalizing 2 We assume that the father and mother behave as a unit, so we do not account for any couple decision making process. 3 In terms of Kolm (2006) , parents may give equal transfers because they have a constraint to be fair. This constraint may have its origin in a social norm that dictates to treat all siblings equally. This is the justification used by Lundholm & Ohlsson (2000) [ ]
Subject to:
C is the consumption of the child j (j=1,2), j I denotes the pre-transfer income and β is the parameter for parental altruism; the larger this parameter, the more important the child's wellbeing is for the parent. The last two expressions in the right side of equation 1 account for the dissatisfaction of the parent when she gives unequal transfers and for her tolerance on the utility losses.
We can understand
as a constraint of the parent to be fair. The parent prefers to give equal transfers in order to be fair, so that giving unequal transfers reduces her utility. The parameter γ measures the size of the concern with fairness; naturally if γ =0, the parent has not any concern in being fair and the parental utility would be the traditionally used in a pure altruism setting. Since giving equal transfers implies loss of utility with respect to giving unequal transfers, the expression X γ refers to the maximum loss of utility the parent is willing to bear. To understand this point, we can reformulate the maximization problem (1)-(6) as the comparison between the indirect utilities when the parent gives unequal (V u ) and equal transfers
where:
T is the optimal value for equal transfers. 8a is always larger than 8b evaluated at optimal values (assuming equation 5 is not binding) and the condition to give equal transfers is u e V V ≥ + γ ; therefore γ also indicates the maximum bearable utility loss of giving equal transfers instead of giving unequal transfers. This is just the other side of the coin: a parent who is more concerned with fairness (higher γ ) is also willing to tolerate a larger utility loss for giving equal transfers.
The way the services enter in the optimization problem is made for simplicity and also reveals the fact that the parent obtains utility from services, while the opposite occurs to children. Due to the logarithmic form assumed for the utility functions, the consumption level of each child should be identical at the optimum when γ is zero. This means that the parent is able to offset child income inequality by giving unequal transfers to perfectly equalize consumption. However, recall that the parent also wants to give equal transfers to fulfil her desire of fairness. Doing so, the child consumption levels will be different and hence some degree of inequality on siblings' consumption appears.
The parent solves the optimization problem in two stages; firstly she finds the optimal values of transfers and time services that maximize V u and V e , and secondly she chooses to give equal or unequal transfers according to equation 7. In the first stage, the first order conditions for j T are: (10) and for T is:
The analytical expressions of the optimal results for the value of transfers are complex. Instead, we are more interested to find the partial derivatives of the transfers with respect to the incomes, which are developed in the appendix. The partial derivatives are:
We observe that the transfer amount increases with the parental income; likewise, there is a negative relation between the transfer and the income of the child who receives the transfer. So far, these results are in line with a pure altruistic setting.
In contrast, our results differ when we observe the intra-generational derivatives (which only apply to unequal transfers). In a pure altruism setting (see Laferrere and Wolff, 2006) ,
should be positive because the increase of the income of one child reduces his transfer, so that the parent can give more resources to the other child. In our results,
can also be positive when γ is small enough, i.e. when the parent is not very concerned with fairness. In a pure altruistic setting, an increase of the income of child k lowers the transfers he receives and leads to widen the difference with respect to the transfer of child j. However, in our setting, the parent can reduce the transfer to the child j (instead of increase) in order to shorten the difference between the transfer amounts, and hence fulfil her constraint on fairness.
We present in the appendix the results for corner solutions. Like other transfer models (e.g. Cox, 1987) , we compare the marginal utility of consumption of one child with that of his parent when there is not a transfer, i.e. when the consumption of each party is composed only of his own income. The transfer occurs when the marginal utility of consumption of the child is larger than parent's. Only under this condition, the parent finds optimal to make a transfer. Thus, we can define the latent variable
for child j and set that 0 > j T when 0 * > z and zero otherwise. The parental income and sibling's income positively affect the latent variable that determines the decision to transfer, which is quite intuitive. A richer parent has more means to give a transfer to her child, while a richer sibling frees resources that can be devoted to the other child. In this regard, Laferrere and Wolff (2006) argue that the transfers are substitutes when there are many recipients. Finally, the own income of child j inversely affects the latent variable, which also is intuitive.
Concerning to the services supplied to parents, it is easily observable from the first order conditions of S 1 and S 2 that
, which holds for both unequal and equal transfers. Therefore, the amount of services is independent of the level of transfers and incomes, which contrasts sharply with the implications of the exchange regime 5 . We concentrate our attention on the monetary transfers.
We can observe the probability of giving equal or unequal transfers by using a latent variable approach. Define . Therefore, the probability of giving equal transfers is lower in the families that exhibit more siblings' income inequality. This can be interpreted as that the parent wants to give equal transfers in order to obey her fairness, and hence she does not relieve income inequality between her children. However, when this inequality widens, the parent starts to give unequal transfers.
The parameters for altruism and concern with fairness have different effects on the latent variable. In the appendix, we show 0
. This result accords with the intuition that a parent who is more worried in being fair, is more likely to allocate equal transfers. In contrast, the altruism can affect the latent variable positively and negatively. In the region of low values of altruism the latent variable increases with the value of the altruistic parameter and hence the probability of giving equal transfers increases; the opposite occurs in the region of high values of altruism (see appendix).
For low values of altruism, the gains of parental utility come mainly from reductions in the term 2 1 2 ) ( T T − γ of the equation 1, so that the parent tries to shorten the transfer's gap when the altruistic parameter increases. Hence, it is more likely that the parent transfers equal amounts to her children. On the other hand, for high values of altruism the parent losses more utility when she is not able to give different transfer amounts. When the altruistic parameter is larger, the well-being of the children accounts for a greater part of the parent's utility. And according to the first order conditions we observe that the parent maximizes her utility and that of her children by giving unequal transfers. Hence, the probability of giving equal transfers diminishes when the altruistic parameter is larger. We can conclude that the level of altruism is not very informative about the existence of equal transfers in the family because a given level for the latent variable (and its corresponding probability) can be compatible with two different values of the altruistic parameter. In other words, we might expect that the relation between altruism and the probability of giving equal transfers is a U inverted type.
In sum, the model predicts a positive relation for i) the transfer amount and the parental income, ii) the probability of giving a transfer and the parental income, and iii) the probability of giving a transfer and the sibling's income; and a negative relation for iv) the transfer amount and the child's income, and v) the probability of giving a transfer and the child's income. The model does not predict an unambiguous relation between the amount of the transfer and the sibling's income; however, if the parent is concerned enough with fairness, the relation might be negative, which contrasts with the implication of a pure altruism setting. Regarding the results for the probability of giving equal transfers, the model predicts a negative relation with the siblings' income inequality and a positive relation with the concern with fairness; and there is not an unambiguous relation for the relation with altruism.
Due to the complexity to find the analytical solutions for the optimal values of the model, we calibrate the model in section 2.3 by simulating distributions of the parameters. Furthermore, the above-mentioned results are tested in the econometric section by using the database SHARE. Since one of the main objectives to study the transfers within family is to analyse the effects of redistribution policies, the next section presents the implications of our model on the neutrality results of redistribution policies. And similar to the derivatives of the model, we also perform simulations and test the neutrality results.
Implications for the neutrality results
If a policy dictates to take one Euro from one child and give it to the parent, the parent neutralises such policy by increasing her transfer to the child by one Euro exactly. This is, essentially, the neutrality result for redistributive policies between generations (Becker, 1974 and Barro, 1974) . The intra-generational neutrality result states that if one Euro is taken from one child and given to the other, then the parent neutralises it by adjusting her transfers accordingly.
The optimal transfers depend on the family members' incomes:
. Take total derivatives with respect to the incomes of two members, maintaining the other constant, and make the exercise taking one Euro from one child and giving it to the other, or taking one Euro from the child and giving it to the parent such that dI 1 =-dI 2 , dI 1 =-dI p or dI 2 =-dI p accordingly. The next four expressions are formed:
The neutrality results appear when each of the preceding expressions is equal to -1, and this is the case in a pure altruism setting. For Laferrere and Wolff (2006) 
are the intra-generational and intergenerational neutrality result, respectively, for
This means that the parent fully replaces, by adjusting her transfers, the Euro that the Government took from one child and gave to the other; and gives back the Euro she received from her child. These results neutralize the redistributive policies both between and within generations. In General, the hypothesis of the neutrality result is rejected when it is tested and some authors consider it as a proof against the importance of the altruism as the motive to give transfers in the family (which is too strong). Based on this regular finding, the exchange approach (Bernheim et al, 1985 and Cox, 1987) appeared as an alternative explanation. In such approach, there is a participation constraint under which the child offers his time services to his parent only if he is compensated enough with the parental transfer. The child receives transfers as a "payment" for his time, so that the exchange is the motive that determines, at the margin, the amount transferred. Under this setting there is no crowding out of the redistribution policies, as is the case in the neutrality result.
However, we consider it is unnecessary to make assumptions of the sort of the participation constraint within the family to establish that the neutrality results do not hold. If the parents are concerned with being fair, as in our model, the neutrality results do not hold. In the appendix we show that dT i /dI p >-1 and dT i /dI i ≠-1
Intuitively, a parent who is concerned with fairness will not fully compensate a change of the income of her children because she also suffers when the difference between the transfers to her children enlarges. Therefore, the redistribution policies still have room to be effective, depending on the characteristics of the distribution of parameters β , γ andθ 7 . In the next section we consider heterogeneous families that have different values for those parameters, and compute the probability of giving equal transfers and the size of the neutrality results.
A numerical example to account for heterogeneity on altruism, concern with fairness and sibling's income
The parent of each family has a different value of β and γ , so that ( ) γ β , defines the type for the parent. Likewise, each family exhibits a different degree of sibling's income inequality θ . Assume β , γ and θ are drawn independently from
Thus, using parameter values drawn from the preceding distributions, we can "observe" the latent variable t* and compute 6 The results also are coherent with the case of equal transfers and are presented in the appendix as well. 7 Similarly, Mitrut & Nordblom (2007) consider that the social norms of duty and reciprocity govern transfers rather than an altruistic income distribution, which also weaken the idea of the crowding-out of public policies. the proportion of the population that give equal transfers. This setting helps us to compare different outcomes in societies that differ on the distribution of altruism, concern with fairness and siblings' income inequality. For instance, if the cdf's of θ are ) (
society 1 is less equally distributed), and all other things equal; then the proportion of population giving equal transfers in society 1 is lower than in society 2. Likewise, a larger part of families gives equal transfers in a society where its members are more concerned with fairness. This can easily be observed by computing the latent variable t* using the distributions of footnote 8. The results of this exercise are in table 2. In the first simulation 9 , we observe that 34.3% of the parents give equal transfers. If we allow a more equal distribution of siblings' income by modifying the distribution's parameters accordingly, then the fraction of parents giving equal transfers increases to 52.1% (second column). The third simulation shows the effect of an increase of the concern with fairness among the population. In that situation, the parents can tolerate larger differences between the incomes of their children, so that more of them (59%) are prompted to give equal transfers. In the last column, we consider the parents becoming less altruistic. Since β was concentrated in high levels, the reduction of the altruistic feeling causes a raise of 3.1% in the probability of giving equal transfers. All these results accord the implications of our model.
The results regarding the influence of the siblings' income distribution and the concern with fairness on the prevalence of equal transfers are remarkable. A larger portion of parents give equal transfers in a society with low income differences among siblings and whose members are more concerned with being fair. The opposite happens in a society less concerned with fairness and with child incomes more unequally distributed. We presume that some European countries may be examples for the first type of society while the US may be closer to the second type. This could explain the small fraction of parents giving equal transfers in US and the higher prevalence of equal transfers in Europe (see table 1 ).
The neutrality results are computed for each family, and the average is reported in table 3. As in our predictions, the intergenerational result is larger than -1 for both children. The parent gives back between 0.35 and 0.49 of the Euro that she previously received from the child 1. The size of the neutralization is bigger when the Euro is taken from the poorer child (child 2), which ranges from 0.70 to 0.81. The intra-generational result can be negative or positive from child 1's view but only negative from the view of child 2. When the Government transfers one Euro from the richer child to the poorer one, the parent can reduce the total amount of her total transfers and obtain more utility by increasing her own consumption. In doing so, it is possible that the parent decreases (instead of increase) the transfer to the richer children if she is concerned enough with fairness. This is the reason why dT 1 /dI 1 can be positive (see the appendix). In contrast, if the Government transfers one Euro from the poorer child to the richer one, the parent has to remedy this increase in child 
Data, empirical strategy and results

The data
We use the first wave of SHARE released 2. Harmon et al (2003) in their analysis on the returns to education in European countries, some sample bias could exist but this appears not to be large.
Empirical strategy
As in other similar studies, we first analyse the probability that a child receives a transfer from his parent. The dependent variable is a latent variable z i *. However, we only observe z i which takes the value of 1 if the latent variable is z i *>0, i.e. the child j receives a transfer from his parents, and 0 otherwise. The model is:
X kj includes the characteristics of the child and his parents. Assuming ε j is normally distributed with zero mean, we estimate a probit equation. According to the theoretical model, we should expect a positive effect of the parental income and sibling's income on the probability of giving a transfer. Likewise, the effect of the child's own income should be negative. Secondly, we use a type I Tobit model regression to test the derivatives implied in the theoretical model. The dependent variable is the amount of transfer in euros (divided by the purchasing power parity 13 The ECHP is a dataset widely used in economic research and according to some examinations shown in Börsch-Supan et al (2005) , it has similar distributions to those of SHARE in key concepts like employment, income, education and health. We construct the dependent variable (log of hourly labour income) using the yearly net wage and the variables that enter into the country-gender regressions also are measured in SHARE, i.e. age and its square, marital status and education level. The results (not reported but available at request) perform well and the estimated incomes per country show a ranking similar to other studies (e.g. Brunello et al, 2007) . ratio, ppp) received by child j (T j ) and the explanatory variables are the same that enter into the probit regression:
μ is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Although some studies use a type II Tobit model (Cox, 1987; Cox & Rank, 1992 and Laferrere, 2001 are some examples) we favour a type I model. This type of model is also used by Schoeni (1997), Hochguertel & Ohlsson (2008) , Sloan et al (2002) and Cigno et al (2004) 14 . The estimated coefficients are conditioned on transfer amount censored at zero value; thus the results must be interpreted as conditioned on positive transfers. Since the dataset includes observations of siblings who share common familial characteristics, it is adequate to consider clustering for the estimation of robust standard errors. Thus, in the variance-covariance matrix, all siblings from the same family are treated as a particular cluster.
As third regression model, we run a probit model for the probability of giving equal transfers. In this case, the unity of analysis is the household. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the parents give equal transfers to all their children, and zero otherwise. The expected results of this regression model are fully described in the theoretical model. Similar to McGarry (1999), we only consider households where the parents make at least one transfer to one of their children. The author argues that zero transfers to all children do not mean a desire to treat all of them equally. Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the decision and amount of transfer. As expected, parental and child income are significant and positively and negatively affect the decision to transfer, respectively. Likewise, the income of the sibling increases the probability of receiving a transfer, which suggests that child and sibling's income are substitutes. The results are the same in the Tobit regression. The magnitude of the effects of income variables in the transfer probability is not too high.
Results
An increase of 10,000 Euros in the yearly income of the parent, child or sibling affects the probability of receiving a transfer by 0.3%, -2.1% and 0.49% respectively.
The same boost in the parental income positively affects the amount transferred by 183 Euros, while such increase in child income reduces the transfer amount by 860
Euros. Recall from section 2.2 that neutrality results hold when the corresponding subtraction of derivatives is equal to -1. Clearly, neither intergenerational neutrality result (-0.086-0.018=-0.104) nor intra-generational result (-0.086-0.053=-0.139) hold;
we reject at large significant levels that they are not different from -1.
Education and health status are also significant variables. More educated and healthy parents can give larger transfers and with more probability, which is quite intuitive. The level of education of the child increases the probability to receive transfers from parents. McGarry (1999) argues that schooling of child is viewed as a proxy for permanent income and thus, holding current income constant, a higher permanent income suggests the child is more liquidity constrained and therefore has a greater probability to receive a transfer. Likewise, McGarry (1999) and Cox & Rank (1992) point out that education may include effects of past transfers: parents who were generous in the past with the expenditures on child education are also generous in the present with transfers 15 . Age of children is negatively related to the probability and amount of transfers. This result accords with the fact that children belonging to earlier stages of life-cycle are more liquidity constrained and need more financial support from their parents.
In our sample, a married child has less possibility to receive a transfer and also receives smaller amounts of transfers. A priori, the final effect of child's marital status is not clear; a spouse can raise the family income, bringing to the household her own resources, or decreases the income per capita if she does not bring any income. In the first case, the probability of receiving a transfer would decrease while in the second case it would raise. Furthermore, having a spouse implies another set of parents who could help with more transfers. The gender of the child does not matter statistically in the chances to receive a transfer. The number of children (or grandchildren from the parents' view) enters significantly and positively in the probit and Tobit regressions, which is understandable since an additional grandchild exerts extra expenses and reduces income per capita in the child's home. The regressions show that the coefficient for number of siblings is negative and significant. Siblings may be seen as competitors to receive transfers and it is clear that the more siblings the lower probability to get a transfer and the lower amount.
The variables hours of help, contact with parents and distance from parental home, are proxies for the child services S j that we described in the theoretical framework. In particular, the variable most related to child service is hours of help but it is not significant in any regression. Contrary, the frequency of contact with parents and the distance between child and parental home are both positive and significant 16 .
Recall from our theoretical implications that there is not an exact relation between transfers and child services. Table 8 shows the results for the probability of giving equal transfers. The unit of analysis is the household, thus the variables related to children are expressed in relative terms. For instance, the variable for children income is the positive difference between the maximum and minimum value of the incomes of children belonging to the same family. Only for the variable distance from parental home, we use a ratio between the maximum and minimum value instead of difference in order to control for important country differences in territory size. The variable of main interest is the difference between siblings' income, i.e. the θ from our theoretical framework. This variable is significant and negative, which accords with our predictions: the larger the siblings' income inequality, the lower the probability of giving equal transfers. For example, an increase of 1,000 euros in the difference between yearly child incomes reduces the probability of giving equal transfers by 0.94%. The difference in the values of contact with parents among siblings is significant but not in distance from parental and hours of help. There is not a clear picture about the effects of child services on the probability of giving equal transfer, but apparently larger differences in contact frequency shown by children may drive parents to reduce the probability of giving equal transfers.
According to our model, there is not a linear relation between the parent's altruism and the probability of giving equal transfers. We argued that a given probability of giving equal transfers may be compatible with two different degrees of altruism. In the survey there is not a variable that can measure the parental altruism itself, but we found a proxy measured for the sample of persons who completed the self-administered questionnaire of SHARE. Individuals who participated in such questionnaire were asked how much they agree with the next statement: "parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being".
The responses range from 1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree. In figure 1 , we consider that 1 is the highest value for the altruism of one person and 5 is the lowest.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, the non-linear relation depicted in figure 1 suggests that a given probability of equal transfers is compatible with different levels of altruism. We do not include the proxy for altruism in our precedent regressions because the sample would be considerably reduced 17 , and self-selection problems might appear due to the nature of the drop-off questionnaire.
It is worth to mention that our results, particularly on the decision to transfer may be due to or influenced by income shocks suffered by the children before the date of the survey application; but nevertheless the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to account for those past shocks 18 . Furthermore, we find that our results can be comparable to those that use American data. For instance, the coefficient of variation of the parental income in our sample is rather similar to that of McGarry (1999) and McGarry & Schoeni (1995) who use the HRS and AHEAD datasets.
Although it would be ideal to measure the percentage that the transfers represent with respect to the child's income in the studios made with European and American data, there is only available and comparable data for parental income. And we find that the proportion of the transfers with respect to the parental income is similar. Thus, differences between European and American parents with respect to their transfer 17 It may reduce the sample from 1,552 to 1,075 observations. The coefficient of this proxy is not significant when it is included (linearly or non-linearly) in the last probit regression. Furthermore, this variable is not highly correlated with the other covariates. 18 The only available variable potentially related to an income shock is the current employment (unemployment) status of the child; but its inclusion in the first two regressions, as a dummy variable indicating that the child is unemployed, does not change the results. The coefficient was positive and significant in both cases.
behaviour do not necessarily rely on sample design differences or on sharp income variability 19 .
Conclusion
According to the survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, release 2.0.1) we observe that there is a high prevalence of Europeans giving equal financial transfers to their adult children, regardless of siblings' income differences.
This behaviour is not predicted by any conventional model on family transfers. We intend to explain this conduct by modelling parental transfers as altruistically and fairly determined. We include explicitly a parameter for the parent's concern with fairness. For fairness, we understand equal transfers to each sibling.
In our model the type of the parent is defined by her degree of altruism and concern with fairness. Likewise, children show different levels of income, so that we can build a measure for income inequality among siblings within family. We argue the parents do not relieve income inequality among their children (as in the pure altruism model) and decide to give equal transfers in order to fulfil a constraint to be fair. However, the parents might start to give larger transfers to the poorer children if the income inequality among siblings becomes unbearable. Contrary to the pure altruism model, the intra-generational and intergenerational neutrality results of the redistribution policies of our model do not hold, and therefore there is still room so that such policies are effective. This aspect coincides with the results from other altruistic-based models that have relaxed the Becker-Barro's neutrality results.
Applying simulations, the predictions of our model are still valid when we add heterogeneity (by simulating) in the parental parameters of altruism and concern with fairness, and in the sibling's income inequality for each family. Furthermore, European microeconomic data from SHARE allows us to find evidence for a negative effect of sibling's income inequality on the probability of giving equal transfers.
Finally, almost all partial derivatives from our model find support on the econometric results for the corner and interior solutions. 
Tables and Figures
Age
It takes the age of the male if the respondent lives with a couple, otherwise it takes the age of the respondent herself.
High school It takes value 1 if the respondent has a high school degree 3 & 4) . If the respondent lives with a couple, we choose the education of the male.
Higher education It takes value 1 if the respondent has a higher degree 5 & 6) . If the respondent lives with a couple, we choose the education of the male. At least one parent in bad health condition 
Number of siblings
Indicates the number of siblings of the child.
Number of children
Indicates the number of children of the child. Hours of help given to parents Hours of any kind of help received from children in the last 12 moths, adequately computed from frequency reports.
Contact with parents
It measures the daily frequency of contact of respondent with her children. The code variable is converted into days as follows: 1)Daily =365; 2)Several times a week =182; 3)About once a week=52; 4)About every two weeks=26; 5)About once a month=12; 6)Less than once a month=6; 7)Never=0.
Distance from parental home
It measures the distance into kilometres between the respondent's home and that of her children. The code variable is converted in kilometres as follows: 1)In the same household=0; 2)In the same building=0; 3)Less than 1 kilometer away=0.5; 4)Between 1 and 5 kilometers away=2.5; 5)Between 5 and 25 kilometers away=15; 6)Between 25 and 100 kilometers away=62.5; 7)Between 100 and 500 kilometers away=300; 8)More than 500 kilometers away=500; 9)More than 500 kilometers away in another country=500. Others
Transfer amount
It indicates the amount in Euros (at least 250 euros) that the respondent gave to her child in the last 12 moths.
Country dummies
It takes 1 for the country, 0 otherwise. 
D. Neutrality results
As before, assume 2 1 I I > . 
